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Abstract 
The hindsight bias refers to the tendency of people, after an event, to overestimate 
how accurately they would have predicted the outcome had they been asked in advance. 
The consequences of the hindsight bias on clinical decision making are significant. The 
bias is believed to impede one's ability to learn from experience and to lead to an undue 
level of confidence in future decision making. Research has shown that, under some 
conditions, groups have been shown to be less susceptible to bias than individual decision 
makers. The hindsight bias also has been found to be attenuated under certain conditions 
involving an increase in cognitive effort. The current investigation sought to answer the 
following questions: (a) Will groups demonstrate less hindsight bias in their decision-
making efforts than individuals?, .and (b) Can the hindsight bias be reduced in groups 
similar to previous results among individual decision makers? Undergraduate students 
. (N = 180) read two case vignettes, either as individuals or in groups and predicted 
outcome probabilities, either with the· benefit of outcome information or without. Half of 
the participants provided with outcome information were also asked to complete a 
counterfactual reasoning task. Data were analyzed using the binomial sign test and with 
multivariate analyses of covariance statistics (MANCOV A) with deliberation time 
included as a potential covariate. Nonparametric analyses indicated that groups were just 
as susceptible to the hindsight bias as individuals. The hindsight bias could not be 
eliminated using a counterfactual reasoning task. Implications of the results are 
discussed along with suggestions for future research. 
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Hindsight Bias 
Hindsight is the means by which we are all able to see, after an event, what 
should have been done. It is not difficult to evaluate a situation or circumstance once 
1 
it has come to pass, hence, the adage "hindsight is 20/20." In the present, however, we · 
are continually making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. We cannot know 
ahead of time how the future will play out. So, in the moment, we weigh the pros and 
cons of deciding one way or the other, we make our choice, and we wait to see 
whether the outcome will be positive or negative. In advance, we can only predict 
· what the outcome might be. 
The hindsight bias, or the "knew-it-all-along"_ effect, refers to the tendency of 
people, after an event, to overestimate the likelihood that they correctly would have 
predicted the outcome's occurrence had they been asked in advance (Arkes, Faust, 
Guilmette, & Hart, 1988). In other words, once an event ha5 occurred, we are 
generally unable to return to our "foresightful" state of mind. We cannot ignore what 
we know has already happened. Thus, hindsight appears to be somewhat myopic, 
rather than 20/20. 
The consequences of the hindsight bias on subsequent decision making are 
significant. The bias is believed to impede one's ability to learn from experience and 
to lead to an undue level of confidence in future decision making. That is, if we 
remember being more correct than we actually were, then we will not only fail to learn 
from our inaccuracies, but we will be lulled into a false sense of confidence in our 
ability to predict the outcome of events. Overconfidence is, in fact, another biasing 
factor in human decision making in its own right. The hindsight bias is just one 
expression of the overconfidence that has been demonstrated across a broad range of 
judges and decision tasks (Arkes et al., 1988). Research has demonstrated, for 
example, that confidence in judgment increases as more information is reviewed, 
althoughjudgment accuracy is not likewise improved (Oskamp, 1965). 
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. Overconfidence has also been found to lead to insufficient consideration of alternative 
possibilities and to premature closure in the decision process, thus further decreasing 
judgment accuracy (see Fischhoff, 1982, for an overview). 
The hindsight bias was first empirically documented by Fischhoff (1975), and a 
steady stream of research has been conducted on the hindsight bias in the over 20 years 
since his work was first published. A meta-analysis of the hindsight bias effect was 
conducted by Christensen-Szalanski and \Villham (1991); They analyzed 122 
empirical studies with calculable effect sizes and found the average weighted effect 
size to be small, but statistically significant ( corrected r = .21 to .29). · To date, the 
hindsight bias. has been documented .in a variety of contexts and with an array of 
participants from many walks of life. The following is a review of the empirical • 
research currently available on the hindsight bias effect. 
Research Findings 
As noted, numerous laboratory studies investigating the hindsight bias have 
shown that there is a significant, reliable effect of outcome information on subsequent 
probability judgments (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). The hindsight bias effect has been 
investigated in a variety of sample populations. As with much laboratory research, the 
vast majority of empirical studies (more than 40) have been conducted with college 
and university undergraduate students (for examples see Fischhoff, 1975; Hasher, 
Attig, & Alba, 1981; Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Ofir & Mazursky, 1997). Other 
sample populations that have_ been studied include: graduate students, primarily in 
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business fields (Brown & Solomon, 1987; Buchman, 1985; Bukszar & Connolly, 
1988; Connolly & Bukszar, 1990; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Mitchell & Kalb, 
1981);judges and jurors (Anderson, Lowe, & Reckers, 1993; Casper, Benedict, & 
Perry, 1989); nurses, physicians and surgeons (Arkes et al., 1981; Detmer, Fryback, & 
Gassner, 1978; Jones, 1995); neuropsychologists (Arkes et al., 1988); cognitive 
psychologists (Pohl & Hell, 1996); community residents (LaBine & LaBine, 1996; 
Mark & Mellor, 1991; Verplanken & Pieters, 1988); university football fans (Leary, 
1981; Roese & Maniar, 1997); and high school students (Stahlberg et al., 1995). 
The main effect found in studies of hindsight bias is that of outcome 
information. If participants are asked to predict the outcome of an event prior to its 
occurrence, they generally give moderate estimates that are consistent with base rates, 
or the general odds, for the event. If people are asked after an event's occurrence to 
remember their original prediction (i.e., memory design) or to make predictions as if 
they did not know the outcome (i.e., hypothetical design), however, they consistently 
skew their predictions toward the actual outcome, demonstrating that their responses 
are affected by the outcome information they have received. In addition, these 
individuals routinely report having more confidence in their ratings and claim to have 
had more information to make their decision than their foresight counterparts, even 
when the same people are making both sets of predictions (Bodenhausen, 1990; 
Powell, 1988). Other factors also have been found to mediate, or interact with, the 
biasing effect of outcome information. 
Outcome occurrence versus nonoccurrence. It generally has been found that 
the magnitude of the hindsight bias is higher for events that did happen than for events 
that did not happen (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; LaBine & LaBine, 1996). In a meta-
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analysis of the hindsight bias effect, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) found 
a significant correlation between the size of the biasing effect and whether the 
outcome information stated that the event occurred. For example, in one of the 
original publications on hindsight bias by Fischhoff and Beyth (1975), individuals 
estimated higher probabilities in hindsight than they originally had estimated for 
events which they believed to have occurred. Seventy-five percent of the hindsight 
participants assigned higher probabilities to events they believed had happened, versus 
only 57% of hindsight participants who reported lower probabilities to events they 
believed had not happened, a difference that was statistically reliable. In another study 
by LaBine and LaBine ( 1996), individuals made determinations of negligence in 
Tarasoff-type cases, referring to a California court decision stating that when a 
therapist determines that a patient may be dangerous, the therapist has a duty to take 
steps to protect any potential victim . In this study, community members (i.e., potential 
jurors) demonstrated a higher degree of hindsight bias when the event had occurred 
(e.g., the patient became violent) than when the event had not occurred. Essentially, 
patient violence was seen as having been more foreseeable when participants were told 
that violence had occurred than when they were told that it had not occurred. In 
addition, when participants were told that the patient had become violent, the 
therapist's actions were seen as more negligent and less reasonable than when subjects 
were told that violence had not occurred. 
Outcome valence. Another factor that appears to influence the degree of 
hindsight bias is the valence (i.e., positive or negative) of the outcome presented to 
• participants. In general, negative outcomes lead to a hindsight bias effect of greater 
magnitude than when positive outcomes are reported (Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991 ). 
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The person who made the decision that led to the negative outcome is viewed as more 
responsible for the outcome and more internal attributions are made of that person 
regarding the reason for the outcome (compared to when a positive outcome is 
reported) (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981 ). In two studies of court cases, when the defendant 
was found guilty (i.e., negative outcome), the jurors reported, in hindsight, that the 
defendant was less likely to be innocent and that police were justified in their 
warrantless search of the defendant's home (Bodenhausen, 1990; Kagehiro, et al., 
1991). When a technological disaster was portrayed (versus no disaster), the company 
was held increasingly responsible, more anger was reported toward the company, and 
more sympathy was reported for the community residents (Brown, Williams, & Lees-
Haley, 1994 ). In contrast, when a favorable outcome is reported, the decision maker is 
generally evaluated, in hindsight, as a better thinker and as more competent (Baron & 
Hershey, 1988). 
Task difficulty. The difficulty of the task participants are required to engage in 
during these studies also appears to moderate the hindsight-bias effect to some degree. 
In general, research has demonstrated that the hindsight bias is more pronounced on 
easy decision tasks, whereas the bias is not as prevalent given a more difficult decision 
task (Hudson & Campion, 1994). Level of training, however, may interact with task 
difficulty to create this effect. For example, Dawson et al. (1988) examined the effect 
of the hindsight-bias phenomenon in clinicopathologic case conferences attended by 
physicians and medical students. They found that the medical students demonstrated 
hindsight bias on cases that were both easy and difficult to diagnose. In contrast, the 
attending physicians showed hindsight bias on the easier cases but not on difficult 
cases, indicating a more thorough decision process or at least an appreciation of the 
difficulty involved in the diagnosis of more complicated cases. 
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Familiarity. It might be inferred from the previous discussion regarding task 
difficulty that an increased level of training would ensure less bias and more accurate 
decision making. For example, Dawson et al. (1988) concluded that the more 
experienced physicians demonstrated less hindsight bias than did the medical student 
trainees. In their meta-analytical study of the hindsight bias, Christensen-Szalanski 
and Willham ( 1991) also found a significant correlation between the size of the 
hindsight effect and the participants' familiarity with the task. That is, the more 
familiar a person is with the task, the smaller the hindsight bias effect. This finding, 
however, contrasts with a large body of research in other areas of clinical decision 
making demonstrating that more experienced clinicians are more confident and more 
susceptible to certain decision errors than those less experienced (for example, see 
Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen, 1986). Contradictory examples can be found in other 
hindsight bias research as well. For example, a study by Arkes et al. ( 1981) revealed 
that medical-college faculty physicians with a great deal of knowledge regarding 
disease and diagnosis were still susceptible to the hindsight bias. 
Time elapsed. Studies on the hindsight bias phenomenon also indicate that 
time (between foresight and hindsight estimates) influences the degree of the effect. It 
appears that the hindsight bias may take some time to emerge and that the effect may 
grow stronger with time. In one study by Bryant and Brockway ( 1997), a hindsight 
bias effect for the more likely outcome was present within 48 hours, whereas a 
significant effect for the less likely outcome took one week to emerge. In a similar 
paradigm, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) reported that 67% of participants demonstrated 
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a significant hindsight bias effect (in the expected direction) after two weeks, whereas 
84% of the participants demonstrated an effect after three to six months. 
Unlikelihood of event. A final factor that has been found to mediate the 
hindsight bias effect is the likelihood of the event. It appears that the less likely an 
event is, the greater its influence on decision-making errors. That is, the biasing effect 
of outcome information has been demonstrated to be strongest for events that were 
initially judged to be the least plausible (Arkes et al., 1981; Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff, 
1977; Wood, 1978). 
In summary, the hindsight bias effect has been demonstrated with individuals 
in various contexts to be a consistent and robust impediment to human decision 
processes. In addition, the effect appears to be mediated by or to interact with various · 
other factors, including task and event variables as well as characteristics of those 
making the foresight and hindsight predictions. The research available on whether 
groups are as susceptible to decision making bias has revealed mixed, although 
somewhat promising , results. 
Group Decision Making 
Research regarding group versus individual decision making has addressed 
four biases aside from the hindsight bias, namely fundamental attribution error, · 
consensus underutilization, the base-rate fallacy, and illusory correlation with mixed 
results. A study by Wright and Wells (1985) found that group discussion attenuates 
the dispositional bias ( or fundamental attribution error). This bias involves a lack of 
consideration of situational contributions to the behavior of others, while 
simultaneously failing to consider the contribution of dispositional forces on one's own 
behavior. In a similar vein, Wright , Luus, and Christie (1990) investigated the use of 
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consensus information in group versus individual decision making. Consensus 
information comprises beliefs about how other people have or would have behaved in 
a similar situation. To date, individual decision makers have tended to underutilize 
consensus information in their decision making. Wright, Luus, and Christie found that 
groups were ~ignificantly more likely to include consensus information into their 
decision process than were individual decision makers. 
Three studies have investigated individual versus group utilization of base-rate 
and individuating information. An initial study by Argote, Seabright, and Dyer{l 986) 
revealed that groups relied more on individuating information and less on the base-rate 
information than individual decision makers. The authors concluded that the biases of 
individual decision makers are systematic, rather than random, and that the subsequent 
pooling of individual responses through group discussion may thus potentiate the 
biases instead of ameliorating them. The authors also discussed the influence of 
persuasive arguments theory (PA theory) (Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974)~ which would 
predict that group discussion exposes members to additional arguments in favor of 
using the individuating information. In a follow-up study by Argote, Davadas, and 
Melone (1990), however, groups relied on individuating information and underutilized 
base-rate information only when the individuating information was seen as 
informative. When the individuating information was seen as uninformative, groups 
were less prone to use this information and were more likely than individual decision 
makers to rely on base-rate information. These results are consistent with the PA 
theory when individuating information is infonnative, but .are inconsistent with the 
theory when individuating information is believed to be uninformative. 
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In a similar study of individual versus group decision making, Aspel (1994) 
found that teams of psychoeducational decision makers were no more likely than 
individuals to integrate base-rate information into their decision-making processes. 
The teams did, however, tend to select a more restrictive educational placement based 
on irrelevant information than did individual decision makers. The groups were also 
found to be just as likely as individuals to incorporate irrelevant case information 
. ., 
consistent with an illusory correlation effect. ln other words, neither teams nor 
individuals were influenced by information that should have influenced their 
decisions, but both were influenced by infomiation that should not have influenced 
their decisions. 
In summary, groups tend to perform better than individuals when faced with 
some decision making biases (i.e., fundamental attribution error and consensus 
underutilization), and to perform similarly or worse than individuals on other decision 
tasks. Specifically, groups tend to use relevant base-rate information less often than 
individual decision makers. 
Hindsight Bias in Groups 
There have been two studies, to date, examining the existence of a hindsight 
bias effect in group decision making. The two studies use divergent methodologies 
and research designs and reveal equivocal preliminary evidence. In one study, 
Bukszar and Connolly ( 1988) addressed the question of whether individuals with 
formal training in strategic decision making would be susceptible to the hindsight-bias 
effect. They deµ10nstrated a significant hindsight bias effect among M.B.A. students 
with experience in case analysis and formal training in strategic decision making. 
They also found that this effect was not attenuated in groups. The groups of decision 
makers were just as susceptible to hindsight bias as the individuals. Bukszar and 
Connolly concluded that their study provides evidence in support ofFischhoffs (1975) 
theory of "creeping determinism" in which individuals automatically assimilate 
outcome information, permanently altering their memory for any .foresight judgments. 
The second study, conducted by Stahlberg, Eller, Frey, and Maass (1995) 
sought to establish the existence of a hindsight bias effect in groups while 
simultaneously attempting to determine the probable underlying process responsible 
for the effect. In the first of two experiments, a strong hindsight bias effect was 
revealed among a large sample of German high school students, although the bias was 
of equal magnitude between individuals and randomly assigned groups of three to five 
individuals. The groups were just as susceptible as individuals to the biasing effect of 
outcome information. In the second experiment, undergraduate psychology students at 
a German university were asked to bring two good friends to class, creating groups of 
three well-acquainted members with some common history. In this study, a significant 
hindsight bias effect again was demonstrated. The groups and individuals were 
similarly biased in their decisions, but the groups had better recall of their initial 
predictions (i.e., better hit rates) than individuals, an effect that was found to be 
mediated by the increased amount of time that the groups spent in their decision 
process. 
Stahlberg et al. (1995), however, concluded that their results disconfirmed 
Fischhoffs (1975) theory that hindsight bias is the result of an immediate assimilation 
of outcome information (i.e., "creeping determinism"), thereby permanently altering 
the individual's memory for foresight judgments. They reported groups to be 
somewhat less biased than individuals, although not at a conventional alpha level. 
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According to Stahlberg et al., if Fischhofrs theory were true, individuals and groups 
would_ demonstrate equal degrees of hindsight bias, which they did, according to more 
conventional statistical standards. Rather, the authors concluded that the results of 
their second experiment provided support for a response bias theory in explaining 
hindsight bias differences between individual and group decision makers. According 
to the response bias theory, when decision makers have received outcome information 
and are then asked to recall their original predictions, they either remember their 
original judgment or not. For those decision makers who cannot remember their 
foresight predictions, -they will use the outcome information as an anchor in guessing 
what their original judgment was. The outcome information itself does not erase or 
otherwise alter memory for the foresight predictions. Thus, because groups have more 
than one member and spend more time in deliberation, the likelihood of the original 
. judgment being recalled is higher in groups than in the individual decision maker, 
leaving the groups less susceptible to hindsight bias. Essentially, groups will be less 
likely to have to guess what their original judgments were than individuals. 
Stahlberg et al. (1995) attempted to suggest that groups are somewhat less 
susceptible to hindsight bias, due· to the increased amount of time they take to make 
decisions, which then mediates recall of their original (foresight) judgments. These 
results are equivocal, however, primarily because the results of the two experiments 
were not consistent, and the results that were believed to support the response-bias 
explanation were insignificant at conventional alpha levels. More rigorous research 
will need to be conducted that consistently demonstrates an attenuation of the 
hindsight bias in groups before any conclusions can be made regarding the underlying 
process or processes that mediate the effect . 
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Elimination of the hindsight bias 
Attempts to eliminate the hindsight bias effect in decision making have yielded 
mixed results. Providing participants with instructions to "work harder," as well as 
informing them of the bias and asking them to avoid it, all have proven ineffective in 
reducing or eliminating the biasing effect of outcome information (Davies, 1993; . 
Fischhoff, 197 5; Fischhoff, 1977; Hennessey & Edgell, 1991; Kamin & Rachlinski, 
1995; Pohl & Hell, 1996; Sharpe & Adair, 1993; Wood, 1978). For example, in a 
study by Pohl and Hell ( 1996), participants were told, in advance -of the experiment, 
about the hindsight bias phenomenon and that the point of the experiment was to test 
whether knowing about the bias would reduce or eliminate it. . In a follow-up 
experiment, participants also were provided with individual feedback about their recall 
performance before being tested again . . Neither manipulation reduced the biasing 
effect of the outcome information. Therefore, it appears that attempts to increase 
awareness of the -bias and to increase motivation for accuracy are ineffective in • · 
reducing hindsight bias. 
One method that has demonstrated some success (although inconsistently) in 
reducing hindsight bias is that of formally discrediting the feedback information given 
to participants. Hasher, Attig, and Alba (1981), for example, conducted the most 
widely cited example of this methodology. Their participants completed a simple 
within-subjects hindsight bias paradigm in which predictions were made and feedback 
was given. Then, prior to having subjects restate their prior probabilities, as is usually 
done, the subjects were told that the feedback they had just received was incorr,ect. 
This manipulation was associated with a reduction in hindsight bias . Other attempts to 
manipulate outcome feedback, however, have found no significant reduction in 
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hindsight bias (Connolly & Bukszar, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Also, such a 
counterfactual reasoning technique cannot readily be applied by the clinical decision 
maker to maximize their decision accuracy. Rarely are we provided with feedback 
that a diagnosis we considered accurate, for example, is completely incorrect. 
The only reliable and consistent method that has been reported to reduce or to 
eliminate the hindsight bias has been the use of counter/actual reasoning strategies 
(Arkes et al., 1988; Davies , 1992; Koriat , Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Pohl & 
Hell, 1996; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977). For example, Arkes et al. (1988) conducted a 
between-subjects hindsight bias study with neuropsychologists in which participants 
were asked to read a case report and assign probabilities to four possible diagnoses. 
Some participants also were asked to provide one reason why each of the possible 
diagnoses might be correct. This act alone significantly reduced the degree of 
hindsight bias. Similar studies have been conducted that have been effective in 
decreasing the bias as well. A study cond:ucted by Creyer and Ross (1993) 
demonstrated that the harder participants were made to work during the foresight 
phase (i.e., increased cognitive effort), the lower the degree of hindsight bias. By 
leaving some aspects ·of the task materials ambiguous, participants were forced to put 
forth more effort to complete the task, and this apparently mediated the expected 
biasing effects. Thus, rather than simply instructing participants to work harder -- a 
debiasing technique that has been proven ineffective -- if individuals are forced to 
work harder via increased task demands, their degree of bias is minimized. In a study 
by Pennington ( 1981 ), rather than providing pre-established outcomes to participants 
and asking them to rate. the probabilities of each, the participants were asked to 
generate their own outcomes of the events and to rate the probabilities of each. 
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Although the participants who generated their own outcomes developed fewer 
outcome choices than were provided to the other groups, these individuals 
demonstrated little or no hindsight bias. Thus, it appears that engaging individuals in 
more rigorous cognitive-decision processes, such as considering all of the alternatives 
thoroughly, is the most consistently effective means of reducing the hindsight bias. 
Theoretical basis for the hindsight bias 
As with attempts to reduce or eliminate the hindsight bias, the theoretical 
stances that have been taken in explaining how the hindsight bias arises primarily have 
been motivational or cognitive in nature, with the cognitive explanations being more 
consistently validated than the motivational explanations. 
Theories of a motivational interpretation of the hindsight bias primarily have 
centered . around the concepts of self-esteem and self-presentation (i.e., a desire to 
maintain public or private self-evaluation). For example, Campbell and Tesser (1983) 
found a need for predictability and a self-presentation motive to be positively . 
correlated with the hindsight bias. Verplanken and Pieters (1988), however, 
challenged this conclusion by pointing out that the significant self-presentation effect 
reported is relatively small in comparison to the magnitude of the hindsight bias 
demonstrated. Verplanken and Pieters ( 1988), in their own investigation, examined 
the effect of a "need for cognition" on the hindsight bias. The need for cognition is 
defined as "the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors" (p. 
136), and was found to significantly influence the degree of hindsight bias 
demonstrated by participants -- those high in the need for cognition demonstrated 
nonsignificant levels of hindsight bias whereas those low or medium in their need for 
cognition demonstrated a significant degree of hindsight bias . The authors concluded 
that "need for cognition" is a motivational factor that influences cognition (i.e., 
information processing). 
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There is a substantive body of research also available that disputes these 
motivational interpretations of the hindsight bias. Leary ( 1981, 1982) conducted two 
studies examining motivational explanations and found in both instances that self-
presentation and self-esteem (or ego-involvement) did not influence the degree of 
hindsight bias demonstrated. Synodinos ( 1986), in addition, found no effect of 
political involvement or of self-esteem with regard to hindsight bias. 
Fischhoff (1975), in his foundational work on the hindsight bias, offered a 
theoretical explanation for the existence of the bias, which he termed the "inimediate 
assimilation hypothesis." His theory, among other more recent cognitive explanations, 
has been found to be the most reliable and robust means of explaining why the 
hindsight bias exists in human decision making. The immediate assimilation 
hypothesis assumes that, on receipt of outcome information, judges immediately 
assimilate it with what they already know about the event being considered and 
subsequently are unable to regain their foresightful state of mind. Fischhoff further 
concluded, based on his research, that judges largely are unaware of the effect that 
outcome knowledge has on their perceptions. In fact, when participants were 
explicitly asked to ignore the outcome information, they were not able to, still 
demonstrating the hindsight bias. Pohl and Gawlik (1995) described a similar 
cognitive interpretation of the hindsight-bias phenomenon involving recall from 
memory. Here, hindsight bias occurs as the 'result of "blended recollections," that is, 
probabilities given after outcome information is known consist of a combination of the 
foresight prediction and the outcome information. 
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Other studies agree with Fischhoffs (1975) interpretation of the hindsight bias 
as arising from the fallible nature of cognitive processing, although they disagree v.ith 
the assimilation mechanism he proposes. As previously discussed, Hasher et al. 
( 1981) designed an experiment in an attempt to eliminate the hindsight bias. Foresight 
predictions were elicited from participants; outcome feedback then was followed by a 
manipulation in which the feedback was discredited . . Participants were told that the 
feedback they had just received was, in fact, false and to recall their original 
predictions, ignoring the incorrect feedback. Under these conditions, participants were . 
able to regain their foresightful state of mind, demonstrating no significant level of 
hindsight bias. These authors concluded that, in contrast to Fischhoffs theory, 
outcome information is likely not immediately assimilated into what was previously 
known. If it were, participants in this study would not have been able to ignore the 
feedback they were given, regardless of its accuracy. Further, the fact that the 
hindsight bias has been consistently eliminated using increased cognitive effort calls · .. 
into question whether outcome information is immediately assimilated into what was 
previously known. Perhaps a less extreme explanation is more feasible, such as Pohl 
and Gawlik's (1995) theory of blended recollections, which does not necessitate 
immediate assimilation. 
Another theory of the nature of hindsight bias deserves mention as an 
alternative explanation for its emergence. The availability heuristic describes the 
tendency for people to overestimate the frequency of salient events due to their ease of 
recall. This heuristic has been discussed as a naturally occurring information-
processing strategy that may influence the presence of the hindsight bias. Essentially, 
once outcome information has been presented, the actual outcome becomes more 
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salient (i.e., more available) leading to information-processing difficulty in simulating 
or considering alternatives (Agans & Shaffer, 1994; Detmer, Fryback, & Gassner, 
1978; Powell, 1988). This theory explains the hindsight bias phenomenon as well as 
Fischhoffs (1975) theory without excluding the possibility that, under certain 
conditions such as an increased demand in cognitive effort, the hindsight bias could be 
reduced or eliminated. 
Clinical Implications 
The consequences of the hindsight bias for clinical decision making are 
substantial. The tendency of people, without realizing it, to remember being more 
accurate than they really were ( or thinking they would be more accurate than they 
probably would be) leads to overconfidence in future decision making endeavors. 
Conclusions are reached prematurely, and alternative possibilities are not sufficiently 
considered, which ultimately results in decreased judgment accuracy (Arkes et al., 
1988). Overconfidence has thus been found to lead unduly to reliance on clinical 
judgment (versus statistical evidence) in decision making, which significantly 
increases the likelihood of decision error. Overconfidence has been demonstrated to 
be, it seems, even more stubbornly unalterable than the hindsight bias itself (Fischhoff, 
1982). 
In addition to overconfidence, the hindsight bias similarly impedes one's ability 
to learn from the past. If, after the fact, we remember being more accurate than we 
actually were, we will likely see no reason to improve our decision making. As 
Fischhoff (1975) stated : 
If, in·hindsight, we systematically underestimate the surprises which the 
past held and holds for us, we are subjecting those hypotheses to 
inordinately weak tests and, presumably, finding little reason to change 
them. Thus, the very outcome knowledge which gives us the feeling 
that we understand what the past was all about may prevent us from 
learning anything from it (pp. 298-299). 
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Within the field of psychology, there has been a paucity of research on the 
probable effects of the hindsight bias phenomenon. For example, no study has been· 
reported, to date, examining the impact of the hindsight bias among multidisciplinary · 
team (MDT) functioning, despite the prevalence of such group decision making within 
psychology as well as the significance of the decisions made by these professionals in 
the lives of children and families. The purpose of this investigation is to identify· 
whether the hindsight bias influences the decision making of groups and, if it does, 
whether the bias can be effectively eliminated by minimally increasing cognitive 
effort. 
Hypotheses 
Previous research has yielded mixed results regarding the accuracy of group 
decision making over individual decision making. Therefore, this study addresses two 
broad research questions: (a) Do groups demonstrate less hindsight bias in their 
decision making efforts than individual decision makers?, and (b) Can the hindsight 
bias be reduced in groups similar to previous results among individual decision 
makers? Based on these two general research questions, the following predictions are 
made: 
1. The outcome probabilities of hindsight participants will differ from those
given by foresight participants, with those receiving outcome information giving 
probabilities much closer to the actual outcome than those not receiving outcome 
information. 
2. Group decision makers provided with outcome information will
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. demonstrate the same degree of hindsight bias as individual decision makers provided 
with outcome inf01mation, when compared to group and individual. decision makers 
not provided with outcome information. 
3. Hindsight participants completing a counterfactual reasoning task will
demonstrate less hindsight bias than those hindsight participants not completing the 
counterfactual reasoning task, regardless of whether the decision is made individually 
or in groups. 
4: Groups will take more time than individuals to make their decisions, and 
those completing the counterfactual reasoning task will take more time in their 
decision making than those not completing a counterfactual reasoning task. 
Method 
Participants 
Permission to conduct the study was granted by the Institutional Review Board 
at the University of Rhode Island. Participants were undergraduate students enrolled 
in psychology courses at the University of Rhode Island. Students were recruited as 
voluntary participants for course credit and were all at least 18 years of age, in order to 
secure informed consent. A total of 180 individuals were recruited for participation in 
the study, with all participants completing both individual and group decision making 
tasks. The mean age of the sample was 19.77, with a standard deviation of 4.18 years. 
The age distribution was similar across conditions. Participants' race was distributed 
as follows: 88.9% White, 3.3% Hispanic, 2.8% Black, 2.2% Asian/Pacific Islander, 
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and 2.8% Other/Mixed. Sixty percent of participants were in their first year of college, 
18.3% were in their second year, 8.9% were in their third year, and 12.8 % were in 
their fourth year of college. Most participants (80.0%) received credit for an 
introductory psychology course, 2.2% received credit in a sophomore-level class, 
16. 7% received credit in a junior-level class, and 1.1 % received credit in a senior-level 
class. Groups consisted of three members. Prior investigations in group decision 
making have used groups ranging from three to five members (Argote, Devadas, & 
Melone, 1990; Argote, Seabright, & Dyer, 1986; Stahlberg, et al., 1995; Wright, Luus, 
& Christie, 1990). The greater number of groups created by using the three-person 
format, however, was seen as more statistically beneficial for this study than the 
increase in generalizability attained by using four- or five-person groups. 
Case Materials 
The vignettes were created by the investigator to provide adequate information 
for making outcome predictions and also to maximize generalizability of the results 
obtained from undergraduate students. Rather than using the almanac-type questions 
often employed in hindsight bias research, case vignettes were developed as potentially 
having more relevance for undergraduate students (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990 for a 
review). Also, the vignettes were created to reflect a topic area in which 
undergraduate students already have some experience. Both vignettes were of 
approximately equal length (i.e., between 190 and 200 words). They were also equal 
in number of sentences (i.e., 12) and average word length (i.e., 4 characters), and were 
nearly equal in the number of words per sentence (i.e., 16 and 15). Both were written 
at an eighth grade reading level (Flesch Grade Level, as calculated using the grammar 
check program in Microsoft Word Version 5. la). Each vignette provided a description 
of an individual in the process of applying for admission to college. The vignettes 
were designed to represent either a generally positive or neutral outcome without 
eliciting extreme predictions (i.e., > 90% likelihood in either direction). Both 
vignettes were informally piloted with 15 undergraduate student volunteers from an 
introductory psychology course and were found to elicit significantly different 
outcome predictions[! (14) = 2.39, g < .05]. Table 1 provides a summary of the 
results of this pilot study. 
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Both of the vignettes described a high-school senior applying for admission to 
college. The vignettes were designed to include information that generally is included 
in college application materials, as well as minimal descriptive information about the 
individuals (see Appendix A). Both of the vignettes presented the case of an 
individual who is likely to be accepted to an ivy league college. Participants in the 
hindsight condition also were provided with an outcome statement; indicating whether 
the individual was in fact admitted to their college of choice. Research participants 
then were asked to rate, based on the infom1ation provided, the likelihood that the 
student would be accepted to college as well as the likelihood that _the applicant would 
not be accepted. 
Design and Procedure 
The investigation assessed the influence of three independent variables and 
three dependent variables. The independent variables assessed were: (a) outcome 
(foresight, hindsight, or hindsight plus the counterfactual reasoning task), (b) process 
(group or individual), and (c) case (positive or neutral outcome valence). This resulted 
in a 3 (outcome) by 2 (process) by 2 (case) design, with outcome as a randomly-
assigned between-groups measure (with 60 participants in each of three conditions) 
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and process and case as within-groups measures. The dependent variables were: (a) 
prediction of the likelihood of college admission, ranging from O to 100%, (b) 
adequacy of the case information available, ranging from 0 to 100 ( completely 
inadequate = 0, completely adequate = 100), and ( c) confidence ratings of predictions 
made, ranging from 0 to 100 (not at all confident= 0 and completely confident= 100). 
Participants were provided with a demographic sheet (see Appendix B), the 
case vignettes, and a response sheet (see Appendix C) including a list of two possible 
outcomes. First, participants completed the demographic information. They were 
asked to read the case vignettes in full. Participants then were asked to record the time 
that they began completing their response sheets. Participants then provided 
probabilities for each of the two possible outcomes, with the predictions summing to 
100. Although only one probability rating was needed for parametric statistical 
procedures, it was hypothesized that asking participants to record both the positive and 
negative probabilities would increase the likelihood that they would consider both 
possibilities more thoroughly. Participants in the hindsight bias condition including 
the counterfactual reasoning task (both individuals and groups) additionally were 
asked to state, in writing, one piece of evidence to support each of the two outcomes as 
the primary one. Participants then provided a rating from 0 to 100 as to the adequacy 
of the information provided to them in making their outcome predictions. Participants 
were also asked to rate from 0 to 100 how confident they were in the accuracy of the 
predictions they had made. The time at which participants completed each decision 
making task was recorded to calculate total decision time. The instructions given to 
the participants varied depending on whether decisions were made individually or as 
members of the three-person groups . All responses, however, were written in order to 
maximize the degree of internal validity associated with consistent task completion. 
Appendix D presents a description of the specific procedural guidelines and oral 
instructions. 
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Each participant made decisions on each of two case vignettes (i.e., Case A and 
Case B); one of these decisions was made individually, whereas the other one was 
made within the three-person groups. Decision order (i.e., group--individual vs. 
individual--group) and task order (i.e., Case A--Case B vs. Case B--Case A) were 
counterbalanced and recorded by the investigator. Upon completion of both decision 
making tasks, participants were debriefed and dismissed. Total completion time was 
estimated at forty five minutes, with pruticipants allowed approximately twenty 
minutes for each decision task. Actual decision time was recorded in order to be 
analyzed as a potential covariate. It was hypothesized that groups would require more 
time than individuals and that participants completing the counterfactual reasoning 
task may require more time than those not completing the counterfactual reasoning 
task. As noted above, this factor alone may be a significant source of variance 
between subjects. 
Results 
Two different statistical methods were used to analyze the data. Because the 
probabilities for each outcome in the study were ipsative for each participant (i.e., :EQ 
= l 00), these dependent measures are related and binomial, making the use of 
parametric statistical procedures problematic. Thus, nonparametric analyses were used 
in assessing the relationship across all three dependent variables because 
nonparametric procedures make few assumptions about the nature of population 
distributions (i.e ., distribution-free) (Jaccard & Becker, 1990). Such procedures have 
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also been employed in previous hindsight bias research (Arkes et al., 1981; Fischhoff, 
1975). Parametric analyses (i.e., multivariate analysis of covariance) also were 
conducted to assess the overall magnitude of the relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables . The probability ratings were included in the 
parametric analyses, as well, by isolating one level of the dependent variable for 
inclusion in the analyses (i.e., Q values assigned to the likelihood of acceptance into 
college). 
Nonparametric Analyses 
The binomial sign test was used to compare the number of participants who 
a5signed higher probabilities, confidence ratings, and adequacy ratings in hindsight 
than were given in foresight. This test also was used to compare the number of 
participants in the hindsight condition who assigned attenuated probabilities, 
confidence ratings, and adequacy ratings after completing a counterfactual reasoning 
task than those who did not complete this task. Separate sign test comparisons were 
made for individual and group decisions. The sign test is a procedure that computes 
the direction of the difference between two treatments for all cases and then 
determines the number of increases and decreases in scores. In this way, the direction . 
of the effect is assessed, rather than the magnitude of the effect, as is assessed using 
parametric statistical procedures. If the two treatments are distributed similarly, or 
have a similar effect, then the number of positive and negative differences will not 
differ significantly (Gravetter & Wallnau, 1996). The sign test is often used in a pair-
wise fashion, but in this case the foresight means were used as centering points, or 
anchors, and distributions around these means were assumed to be approximately 
normal. 
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In this sample, over all participants in the individual decision conditions, 39 of 
60 (65%) assigned higher probabilities to the known-to-have-occurred outcome than 
the corresponding estimate obtained from foresight participants~= 2.32; :g = .01). 
Similarly, over all groups in the group decision making conditions, 15 of20 (75%) 
also assigned higher probabilities to the known-to-have-occurred outcome~= 2.24; :g 
= .01). Neither the individual nor the group participants, however, demonstrated a 
significant attenuation of the hindsight bias when asked to complete a counterfactual 
reasoning task, when compared to corresponding estimates obtained from hindsight 
participants not completing the task. Here, 21 of 60 (35%) individual participants 
demonstrated an attenuation of the bias, whereas 12 of 20 (60%) group participants · 
demonstrated an attenuation of the bias, both of which were not significant in 
eliminating the bias (:gs= .19 and .50, respectively). 
With regard to the confidence participants had in their predictions 1 42 of 60 
(70%) individuals provided a higher confidence rating in hindsight than the 
corresponding ratings obtained from foresight participants ~ = 3. l 0; :g = .001 ). In the 
same manner, 15 of 20 (75%) groups provided a higher confidence rating in hindsight 
than the corresponding foresight groups~= 2.24; :g = .01). Again, neither the 
individual nor the group participants demonstrated a significant change in confidence 
ratings when asked to complete a counterfactual reasoning task, when compared to the 
corresponding ratings obtained from hindsight participants not completing the task . . 
Here, 32 of 60 (53%) individual participa,nts demonstrated an attenuation of the bias, 
whereas 13 of 20 (65%) group participants demonstrated an attenuation of the bias, 
both of which were not significant in eliminating the bias (:gs = .09 and .30). 
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When asked to rate the adequacy of the information provided to them, 40 of 60 
(67%) individuals provided a higher adequacy rating in hindsight than the 
corresponding ratings obtained from foresight participants ~ = 2.58; Q = .005). 
Similarly, 15 of20 (75%) groups provided a higher adequacy rating in hindsight than 
the corresponding foresight groups~= 2.24; Q = .01). And again, neither the 
individual nor the group participants demonstrated a significant change in adequacy 
ratings when asked to complete the counterfactual reasoning task, when compared to 
the corresponding ratings obtained from hindsight participants not completing the task. 
Here, 18 of 60 (30%) individual participants demonstrated an attenuation of the bias, 
whereas 10 of20 (50%) group participants demonstrated an attenuation of the bias, 
both of which were not significant in eliminating the bias (Qs > .50). 
When separate sign tests were conducted for each of the two different cases, 
results varied. Tables 2-7 summarize these data. Due to small sample sizes (n = 10), 
group results were assessed using the binomial distribution, rather than using the z-
distribution. Case A (i.e., Jamie) was positively valenced in foresight, with a 72% 
mean probability of being admitted. In hindsight, participants ,,,ere told that the 
individual portrayed in Case A had, in fact, been admitted to the college of his choice. 
Under these conditions, the hindsight bias was not demonstrated among individual 
participants with regard to probability ratings obtained. Only 15 of 30 (50%) 
individual hindsight participants assigned a higher probability of admittance than that 
obtained from the foresight participants ~ = 0.00; g = .50). In comparison, 7 of 10 
(70%) of hindsight participant groups assigned a higher probability of admittance than 
that obtained from the foresight participant groups (Q = .12). A significant number of 
those hindsight participants asked to complete the counterfactual reasoning task tended 
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to assign a higher probability of admittance than hindsight subjects not completing the 
task. Only 8 of 30 (27%) of those individual participants completing the extra task 
gave attenuated probability ratings~= -2.56; Q = .005). In comparison, 7 of 10 (70%) 
of the participant groups completing the extra task gave attenuated probability ·ratings 
(Q = .12). The confidence ratings of individual hindsight participants, however, did 
increase significantly. Here, 20 of 30 (67%) participants assigned higher confidence 
ratings than that obtained from the foresight participants~= 1.85; Q = .03). This 
effect was not shown in hindsight participant groups. Seven of 10 (70%) hindsight 
groups assigned higher confidence ratings than those obtained from the foresight 
participant groups (Q = .12). The confidence ratings of hindsight participants were, 
again, not attenuated for hindsight participants completing the counterfactual 
reasoning task, either among individual or group participants. Only 18 of 30 ( 60%) 
individual participants in this condition gave lower confidence ratings than those 
obtained from the hindsight participants not completing the task ~ = 1. 11; Q = .13). 
Only 6 of 10 (60%) group participants gave attenuated confidence ratings (Q = .21). 
No significant hindsight effect was found with regard to adequacy ratings for Case A. 
Of the 30 individual hindsight participants, 19 (63%) provided higher adequacy ratings 
than those obtained from the foresight participants~= 1.48; Q = .07); Of the 10 group 
hindsight participants, 7 (70%) provided higher adequacy ratings than those obtained 
from the foresight group participants (Q = .12). A significant number of those 
individual hindsight participants asked to complete the counterfactual reasoning task 
tended to assign a higher adequacy rating than hindsight participants not completing 
the task . Only 10 of 30 (33%) of those completing the extra task gave attenuated 
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adequacy ratings~= -1.85; p = .03). Only 4 of 10 (40%) participant groups provided 
attenuated adequacy ratings after completing the extra task (Q = .21 ). 
In comparison, Case B (i.e., Kelli) was neutrally valenced in foresight, with a 
4 7% mean probability of being admitted. In hindsight, participants were told that the 
individual portrayed in Case B had, in fact, been rejected from the college of her 
choice. Under these conditions, 24 of30 (80%) individual hindsight participants 
assigned a higher probability of rejection than that obtained from the foresight 
participants(?;= 3.33; g = .0005). Of the 10 hindsight participant groups, 8 (80%) 
assigned a higher probabilit-; of rejection than that obtained from the foresight 
participant groups (Q = .04). Only 13 of 30 (43%) of those individual participants 
completing the extra task gave attenuated probability ratings~= -0.74; Q = .23). Only 
5 of 10 (50%) of the participant groups completing the .extra task assigned attenuated 
probabilities (Q = .25). A significant number of individual hindsight participants also 
assigned higher confidence ratings. Here, 22 of 30 (73%) individual participants 
assigned higher confidence ratings than that obtained from the foresight participants ~ 
= 2.59; Q = .005). Eight of 10 (80%) hindsight participant groups assigned higher 
confidence ratings than that obtained from foresight participant groups (Q = .04). The 
number of higher confidence ratings of hindsight participants was not attenuated for 
participants completing the counterfactual reasoning task. Only 14 of 30 (47%) 
individual participants in this condition gave lower confidence ratings than those 
obtained from the hindsight participants not completing the task(?;= -.37; Q = .36). 
Only 7 of 10 (70%) participant groups in this condition gave lower confidence ratings 
than those obtained from hindsight participant groups not completing the task (Q = 
.12). A significant hindsight effect also was found with regard to adequacy ratings for 
Case B. Of the 30 individual hindsight participants, 21 (70%) provided higher 
adequacy ratings than those obtained from the foresight participants (z = 2.22; n = 
.01). Of the 10 hindsight participant groups, 8 (80%)provided higher adequacy 
29 
ratings than those obtained from the foresight participant groups (P. = .04). A 
significant number of those hindsight participants asked to complete the counterfactual 
reasoning task, however, tended to assign a higher adequacy rating than hindsight .. 
participants not completing the task. Only 8 of 30 (27%) of those completing the extra 
task gave attenuated adequacy ratings (z = -2.69; Q = .004). The hindsight effect 
regarding adequacy ratings was also not attenuated in the participant groups. Of the 10 
hindsight participant groups completing the extra task, 6 (60%) provided attenuated 
adequacy ratings when compared to the adequacy ratings of hindsight groups not 
completing the task (Q = .21 ). 
Parametric Analyses 
In comparing individual to group decisions , statistical problems can arise. 
Because there were three times as many individual decisions as group decisions, there 
. is likely to be more variance among the individual responses. Therefore, significant 
differences between individuals and groups may arise solely as statistical artifact. In 
order to address this problem, triads of individual responses were pooled (i.e., 
averaged) to reflect the same number of individual and group responses. One 
disadvantage of this pooling procedure, however, is that obtaining a mean of three 
individual responses may closely resemble the group decision-making process. Thus, 
an additional analysis also was conducted in which one of the three individual scores 
was chosen randomly and compared to-the group response. 
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Two 3 by 2 by 2 between-subjects multivariate analyses of covariance 
(MANCOVA) were conducted in order to test for differences among treatment groups. 
The first MANCOV A compared triads of individual responses (i.e., pooled data) to the 
group responses. The second MANCOV A compared randomly selected individual 
responses (i.e., unpooled data) to the group responses. The independent variables 
included were: outcome (foresight, hindsight, or hindsight plus counterfactual 
reasoning task), process (individual or group), and case (positively or neutrally 
valenced): These analyses were conducted to determine whether a hindsight bias 
effect existed in this sample, whether groups demonstrated more or less hindsight bias 
than individual decision makers, whether results depended on case valence, or a 
combination of these factors. Three dependent variables were included in the 
analyses: (a) probability of a positive outcome, (b) information adequacy rating, and 
(c) decision confidence rating. Total decision time was analyzed as a covariate. 
Significant multivariate results were followed up with univariate analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVAs) to determine which of the dependent variables contributed to 
the significant differences. 
Pooled analysis. For the first MANCOV A, in which group-generated 
responses were compared against mean triads of individual responses (i.e., the pooled 
procedure), the only significant finding was a main effect for Case, I: (3,105) = 42.36, 
Q. < .001. No other sources of variation were significant at conventional alpha levels 
(11.s = .10 to .93). Table 8 presents the .E and Q. values for all sources of variation in this 
analysis. Three follow-up ANCOV As then were conducted, one for each of the 
dependent variables. Results showed that only probability ratings accounted for the 
significant main effect, .E (1,107) = 121.01, Q. < .001. .E-values for all other sources of 
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variation in these analyses were not significant at conventional alpha levels (Qs = .10 
to .89). The positively valenced case (i.e., Jamie) was assigned a significantly higher 
mean probability of acceptance (M = 71.08, SEM = 2.04) than the neutrally valenced 
case (i.e., Kelli) (M = 39.17, SEM = 2.04). The means and standard errors for 
adequacy and confidence were: M = 77.60, SEM = 1.28 and M = 75.08, SEM= 1.37, 
respectively. 
Unpooled analysis. For the second MANCOV A, in which group-generated 
responses were compared against randomly selected individual responses (i.e., the 
unpooled procedure), again there was a main effect for Case, E (3,105) = 25.34, n < 
.001; but there also was a.'l interaction effect for Case by Outcome, E (6,212) = 2.21, Q
< .05. No other sources of variation were significant at conventional alpha levels (Qs = 
.16 to . 79). Table 9 presents the E and Q values for all sources of variation in this · 
analysis. 
Similar to the pooled analysis, three follow-up ANCOV As then were 
conducted, one for each of the dependent variables. For these analyses, the Case hy 
Outcome interaction was not significant for either probability [E(2,107) = 2.12, Q =
.13], adequacy [f<l]; or confidence [E.(2,107) = 2.08, 2 =; .13]. The only significant 
finding was a main effect for Case for the probability dependent variable, E ( 1, 107) = 
62.61, p < .001. Again, similar to the pooled analysis, the positively valenced case 
(i.e., Jamie) was assigned a significantly higher mean probability ofacceptance (M = 
69.09, SEM = 2.66) than the neutrally valenced case (i.e., Kelli) (M = 39.24, SEM = 
· 2.66). The means and standard errors for adequacy and confidence were: M = 78.25,
SEM = 1.50 and M = 75.53, SEM = 1.72, respectively.
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Completion Time. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to assess 
differences in the amount of time taken to complete the decision task by Process (i.e., 
between individuals and groups) as well as by Outcome (i.e., between participants in 
the foresight, hindsight, and hindsight plus counterfactual reasoning task outcome 
conditions). These results are summarized in Table 10. There was a main effect for 
Process and for Outcome. The interaction effect between Process and Outcome was 
not significant at a conventional alphaJevel (E<l). Overall, groups (M = 2.53, SEM = 
1.52) took longer to make decisions than individuals (M = 1.88, SEM = 1.08) (p = 
.005). All pairwise comparisons were computed for Outcome using Tukey's Honestly 
Significant Difference test, revealing that foresight and hindsight participants took the 
same amount of time to decide (p = .201 ), whereas those hindsight participants 
completing the counterfactual reasoning task took longer to respond than both 
foresight participants (p < .05) and those hindsight participants not completing the 
extra task (p < .001) (see Table 11). 
Characteristics of the Covariate. In covariance analysis, the effect of the 
covariate on the dependent variables is factored out of the total variance such that 
independent variables are then compared to adjusted dependent variable means. In 
this way, the error term is adjusted for (i.e., reduced) by the relationship between the 
dependent variables and the covariate (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). There are two 
criteria that a variable must meet in order to be considered an appropriate covariate: 
(a) a statistically significant linear relationship must exist between the covariate and all 
dependent variables and (b) homogeneity of the regression hyperplanes must be 
satisfied (i.e., there must be equal regression slopes between the covariate and each of 
the dependent variables). 
Pearson correlations were computed in the current study to assess the 
relationship of the covariate (i.e., task completion time) to the three dependent 
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variables (i.e., probability of acceptance, adequacy rating, and confidence rating) for 
each case. Table 12 summarizes these data. For the positively valenced case (Jamie), 
significant correlations were found across the three dependent variables. Time was 
negatively correlated with the-probability, adequacy and confidence ratings: That is, as 
task completion time increased , probability of admittance, adequacy, and confidence 
ratings all tended to decrease. No significant correlations, however, were found 
between the covariate and any of the three dependent variables for the neutrally 
valenced case (Kelli). :fhus, task completion time does not appear to have met the 
necessary criteria for inclusion as a covariate with regard to the neutrally valenced case 
in this study .. 
Supplementary Group Process Analysis. In order to maximize the internal 
validity of individual and group processes, participants were instructed to form their 
individual responses (in the same way they had in the individual .condition) prior ·to 
engaging in the group decision process. Multiple paired sample t-tests were conducted 
in order to analyze the. subsequent group decision process. Across all dependent 
variables, the average of the three participants' individual responses was compared to 
their respective group response. Including all 60 groups and all three dependent 
variables, this analysis yielded 180 pairwise t-test comparisons. Only two of the 180 t-
test comparisons reached conventional levels of significance, fewer than would be 
expected by chance alone .. These results i.ndicate that each group consensus response, 
regardless of outcome condition, essentially consisted of the pooled average of the 
individual responses generated by the participants comprising that group . 
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Qualitative Analysis 
The forms of evidence provided by hindsight participants completing the 
counterfactual reasoning task were reviewed for differences. These data are 
summarized in Table 13. Many participants provided .more than one piece of evidence 
to support either outcome, despite being required to provide only one. With regard to 
the positively valenced case (i.e., Jamie), however, nearly twice as many pieces of 
evidence were stated for the known-to-have-occurred outcome than for the outcome 
that did not occur CE= 111 vs. 63, respectively). For both cases, purely academic 
evidence (i.e., GPA and SAT scores), which is assumed to be the most highly 
weighted information in college admission decisions, was most commonly cited in 
support of the known-to-have-occurred outcome ( 62% of evidence for the positively 
valenced case and 98% of evidence for the neutrally valenced case). This was not the . 
case with regard to the outcome that was known to have not occurred (3.9% of 
evidence for both cases). Thus, overall, the evidence that is presumed to carry the· 
most weight in college admission decisions was that most frequently cited for the 
known-to-have-occurred outcome, but not for the outcome -that did not occur . . 
Discussion 
Hindsight Bias 
The first hypothesis in the present investigation stated that the hindsight bias 
would be demonstrated. That is, those participants receiving outcome information 
(i.e., hindsight participants) would assign probabilities much closer to the actual 
outcome than those not receiving outcome information(i.e., foresight participants), 
despite being instructed to ignore the outcome information. These results supported 
this hypothesis. As noted, many different methods have been used to measure the 
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hindsight bias. Both parametric and non-parametric statistics have been used. 
Consistent with Arkes et al. (1981) and Fischhoff (1975), this study demonstrated the 
hindsight bias using the binomial sign test. Participants who were provided with 
outcome information tended to provide outcome predictions consistent with the 
known-to-have-occurred outcome , despite being instruc_ted to respond as they would 
have before knowing the outcome. Participants, thus, could not ignore the outcome 
information provided to them, and they subsequently saw the outcome as inevitable. 
Similarly, participants' confidence in their predictions and their rating of the adequacy 
of the information provided also increased in hindsight, when compared to foresight 
ratings. Thus, when the outcome was known, participants were more confident in 
their predictions and felt more secure in the amount of information they had in their 
decision making. In contrast, however, the magnitude of the hindsight bias for 
predictions, confidence ratings, and adequacy ratings in this sample population was 
not sufficient to yield significant results using parametric statistical procedures. 
Results of the analyses in the current stµdy also differed according to .case 
valence. A strong hindsight effect regarding probability of admittance, confidence 
ratings, and adequacy ratings was found for the neutrally valenced case (i.e., Kelli) (2': 
70% of hindsight participants providing biased responses). The greatest biasing effect 
was found for probabilities of admittance, with 80% of hindsight participants 
· providing outcome predictions biased toward the known-to-have-occurred outcome. 
Only a hindsight effect regarding confidence was demonstrated among participants 
responding to the positively valenced case (i.e., Jamie). It is possible, however, that a 
ceiling effect was evidenced with regard to the probabilities in this case ; A positive 
valence in foresight (approximately 70% likelihood of acceptance), together with a 
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positive outcome provided in hindsight may have precluded a significant change in the 
number of participants increasing their predictions beyond the foresight level. The 
restriction in probability range caused by such a ceiling effect may also provide an 
explanation for the non-significant magnitude of the hindsight bias effect yielded in 
the parametric analyses.- Alternatively, the results of the present study may simply 
reflect cognitive issues associated with the two cases used. The neutrally valenced 
case may have created more ambivalence in the individual and group decision makers 
and may have ultimately proven more interesting to the participants. In this way, the 
results of the present study may provide support for greater effects of the hindsight 
bias with more ambiguous cases. This interpretation explains the way in which a 
smaller effect size, such as that found in the meta-analysis of Christensen-Szalanski 
and Willham (1991), may have yielded significant differences with regard to the 
neutrally valenced, ambiguous case but not the positively valenced case. 
Group Versus Individual Decision Making 
The second hypothesis questioned whether groups of decision makers would 
demonstrate more or less hindsight bias than individual decision makers. This study 
demonstrated that groups of decision makers were just as prone to the hindsight bias as 
individual decision makers, consistent with Bukszar and Connolly (1988) and 
Stahlberg et al. (1995). Similar to individual participants, a significant number of 
participant groups provided with outcome information subsequently assigned outcome 
predictions consistent with the known-to-have-occurred outcome, despite being 
instructed to respond as they would have before knowing the outcome. Groups were 
no more able to ignore outcome information provided to them, and they subsequently 
also saw the outcome as inevitable. Participant groups also provided higher 
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confidence and adequacy ratings in hindsight when compared to foresight participant 
groups. Thus, in hindsight , individuals and groups alike tended to see the known 
outcome as inevitable, to be more confident in their predictions, and to feel more 
strongly that they had enough inf01mation to make such predictions. Decision groups 
appear as equally prone to the hindsight bias as individual decision makers . Again, 
however , the magnitude of the hindsight effect was not sufficient in this sample 
population to yield significant results using parametric statistical procedures. 
Prior to engaging in the group decision process, participants first were asked to 
formulate their responses as individuals. This was done to maximize the internal 
validity of the study by ensuring consistency in task completion parameters. A similar 
procedure was employed in the group versus individual decision-making research of 
Bukszar and Connolly ( 1988), who similarly found no attenuation of the hindsight bias 
via the group decision process. Such a procedure, however, may not reflect the way 
group decisions tend to be made in the general population. Without further 
clarification of the true parameters 9f group decision-making, population 
generalizations related to the current findings remain tenuous. 
Further analysis of the group decision process also revealed that participants 
tended, in large part, to average their individual responses when developing their 
group consensus response. This alone may account for the lack of differences between 
group and individual responses in the current investigation. In asking participants to 
predict outcomes using percentages (e.g., versus a dichotomous yes/no format), 
participants may have been encouraged to employ the logical and time-efficient 
strategy of simply averaging their individual responses. Based on an average group 
decision time of under 3 minutes, there appears to have been minimal motivation for 
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debate within the group decision format. Isolating one individual response from each 
group for additional comparison may not have been sufficient to overcome the 
overwhelming degree to which participants averaged their responses when in the group 
decision making format. 
Elimination of the Hindsight Bias 
The third hypothesis in the present investigation stated that hindsight 
participants completing a counterfactual reasoning task would demonstrate less 
hindsight bias than those hindsight participants not completing the task. Results from 
this study did not provide support for this hypothesis. Despite being required to 
examine both outcomes more thoroughly as possibilities, a significant number of 
individual and group responses remained biased to the known-to-have-occurred 
outcome. Hindsight participants completing the extra task were also no less confident 
in their predictions and -felt that the information they were provided with was just as 
adequate, if not more, when compared to those hindsight participants not completing 
the task. Analyses were non-significant using both the non-parametric and the 
parametric procedures. Qualitative analysis of the evidence generated by participants 
completing the counterfactual reasoning task revealed a differential pattern of case 
data cited in support of the known outcome than for the non-reported outcome. In 
college admission decisions, it is presumed that academic factors (i.e., GPA and SAT 
scores) are weighted more heavily than other relevant factors (e.g., volunteer work, 
sports participation, work experience). In this study, purely academic factors were 
cited most commonly in support of the known outcome, and less frequently for the 
non-reported outcome. If participants did, in fact, assign higher decision weights to 
academic than nonacademic evidence, then the counterfactual reasoning task must be 
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interpreted as insufficient, by nature, for attenuating bias toward the known outcome . 
The known outcome was supported by more influential data that was likely to 
overpower any beneficial effects of citing evidence in support of the non-reported 
outcome. Previous research has demonstrated a significant attenuation of the 
hindsight bias using a similar procedure with clinical neuropsychologists (Arkes et al., 
1988), in which evidence was requested for each of three possible outcomes. The 
individual pieces of case information provided to participants in that study, however, 
may have been more equally weighted across outcome diagnoses than in the present 
· study. Similar research also has demonstrated a robust attenuation of the hindsight . 
bias when reasons were generated for the non-occurring outcome only (Davies, 1992; 
Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Pohl & Hell, 1996). It may be hypothesized 
that generating counter/actual reasons alone (i.e., evidence to support only the non-
reported outcome) would have been necessary to eliminate bias toward the known 
outcome in the present study. It is likely that asking participants to provide evidence 
for the known outcome as well may have cancelled out any beneficial effects of the 
counterfactual reasoning task. Thus, the beneficial effect of considering all possible 
outcomes within the decision making process may vary according to the differential 
weights assigned to contributing decision data. The hindsight bias may be reduced 
most effectively by generating evidence only for alternative outcomes, presun1ing that 
the chosen outcome is inherently provided sufficient support by the decision maker. 
Decision Time 
The fourth hypothesis in this investigation stated that groups would take more 
time to make their decisions, and those completing the counterfactual reasoning task 
would take more time in their decision making than those not completing the task. 
These results provide support for this hypothesis. Groups, as predicted, took 
significantly more time to reach consensus than did individual decision makers. In 
addition, those hindsight participants completing the counterfactual reasoning task, 
whether working as individuals or in groups, also took significantly more time to 
respond than did individual and group participants who did not complete the extra 
task. 
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It does not appear, however, that the amount of time taken by different 
treatment groups was a significant source of confounding variance in the present study. 
Overall, time was negatively correlated with probability, confidence, and adequacy 
ratings for the positively valenced case but no significant correlations were produced 
with regard to the neutrally valenced case. Therefore, completion time did not meet 
the statistical criteria necessary for appropriate inclusion as a covariate in parametric 
analyses. In this study, however, completion time was recorded in minutes, and the 
range in amount of time taken was restricted, which may have precluded findings of 
reliably significant correlations between it and the other dependent variables. The low 
overall mean in response time ( <3 minutes) in the current investigation may be a result 
of lower-than-expected task difficulty or it may be a reflection of low participant 
motivation. Low participant motivation also may explain the overwhelming tendency 
(described above) of group participants simply to derive an average of their individual 
responses when asked to reach group consensus. 
Alternatively, task completion time may not, in fact, be a mediating factor in 
the hindsight bias within hypothetical research designs such as the one employed in the 
current investigation. In previous research, group and individual differences were 
found to be mediated by the increased amount of time groups spent in their decision-
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making (Stahlberg et al., 1995): This research, however, employed a memory design, 
in which participants were asked to recall previously formulated predictions after 
having subsequently received outcome information. Within this design format, groups 
were just as likely as individuals to provide biased responses in hindsight. Initial 
predictions, however, were recalled more accurately in groups (i.e., better hit rates), 
presumably as a result of spending more time in the decision process. In contrast, 
using a hypothetical design, participants are not actually required to make foresight 
. predictions - only to respond in hindsight as they would have before. knowing the 
outcome . As such, recall ( or hit rate) is irrelevant in hypothetical designs, essentially 
nullifying the effect of increased decision time according to this hypothesis. And, .as . 
Stahlberg et al. (1995) found, hindsight distortions did, in fact, emerge to an 
approximately equal extent among individual and group respondents using the 
hypothetical design format. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Four limi~tions were identified with regard to the current investigation. First, 
varying the foresight valence of the cases employed (i.e., positive .and neutral) was of 
limited scientific utility because it precluded direct case-to-case comparisons. The 
positively valenced case, because it subsequently was assigned a positive outcome in 
hindsight, additionally may have elicited a ceiling effect in participant responding. 
Future research could employ a completely crossed design, where all participants 
respond to both cases under all conditions, which would allow for more direct . · · 
comparison. Alternatively, future investigations could employ two different cases that 
are both neutral in foresight predictions and then vary the outcome assigned in 
hindsight to allow for more valid comparisons across cases. 
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Secondly, the steps taken to maximize internal validity between individual and 
group decision processes in the current study may have limited both the nature of 
group outcomes and the extent to which group decision data can be generalized to 
typical group decision processes in the population at large. For example, it is unclear . 
if group members processed information in ways consistent with generally recognized 
social psychological principles of group processing ( e.g., conformity, group · 
polarization) (for further examples see Baron & Graziano, 1991 ). Previous research 
examining group versus individual decision making without controlling for process 
factors have yielded mixed results (Aspel, 1994; Wright, Luus & Christie, 1990; 
Wright & Wells, 1985), with some studies supporting less biased outcomes when 
decisions were made in groups. Future research should seek to isolate the group 
decision-making process more specifically. One way to accomplish this would be to 
replicate the design of the current study, adding a third process group composed of 
individuals who had not delineated their individual responses prior to engaging in the 
group decision task. This would provide for a comparison group whose decision-
making processes may be a more accurate reflection of true population decision 
processes. Adding such a comparison group, in tum, may yiold differences from the 
other two decision groups that would provide support for the. group process itsel£ as a 
significant source of variance in attenuating the hindsight bias. 
Third , the counterfactual reasoning task employed in the current investigation 
may have been inherently limited in significantly reducing the hindsight bias by 
inadvertently bolstering support for the known outcome . This is likely to have 
increased the salience of the inherently dominant, known outcome more so than for the 
non-reported outcome. An alternative explanation for the lack of effectiveness of the 
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counterfactual reasoning task relates to pa.'1:icipant compliance with experimental 
instructions. Individual and group participants were instructed to provide only one 
piece of evidence for each of the two possible outcomes. In fact, many participants, 
especially with -regard to the positively valenced case, provided more than one piece of 
evidence for the known outcome. This may have invalidated the counterfactual · 
reasoning task as a means of making the alternative outcome more salient in the 
decision-making process. Future research focused on successful techniques for 
eliminating the hindsight bias should revert to classic paradigms (see Koriat, 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Slovic & Fischhoff, · 1977) in which reasons and 
suppmt are only generated for the non..:reported outcome . If the current methodology 
is replicated, participants should be implored to comply with task instructions as 
given. Alternatively, future investigations could seek to provide more equally 
weighted evidence in support of all possible outcomes. Designing case materials in · 
this way would serve to isolate the debiasing effect of considering all possibilities 
more equally within the decision-making process . · In the current investigation, 
academic data may have been presumed to carry more weight in admission decisions 
and were, therefore, more frequently cited in support of the known outcome . 
Finally, completion time did not meet criteria for inclusion as a covariate in the 
current study . Response time was correlated with the three dependent variables for the · • 
positively valenced case only. It is likely that the restricted range of decision time (M 
< 3 minutes) in the present study precluded reliable correlations between it and the 
dependent variables. Future research should use decision tasks requiring more 
extensive deliberation time in order to determine the nature of the effects of decision 
time on the group decision process . It also is likely that decision time may be 
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irrelevant with regard to the hindsight bias, especially within hypothetical research 
designs. Prior research yielding significant results for decision time within group 
processes employed a memory design, in which previously made judgments had to be 
recalled after receiving outcome information (Stahlberg et aL, 1995). Hit rates 
improved in the group process (presumably as a function of increased time in 
deliberation), but groups were equally biased in hindsight when compared to the 
individual decision makers. Thus, the hindsight bias itself, in fact, may not be 
mediated by the increased time spent in deliberation among groups. Further 
investigation wiil be necessary to delineate the confounding effect of increased 
decision time more clearly in groups versus individual decision makers. Increased 
decision time may simply be inherent in a task involving the integration of ideas from 
n+ 1 group members versus one individual decision maker and have no differential · 
effect on the resulting outcome data . 
Conclusions 
In summary, the present investigation provided support for the presence of the 
hindsight bias in human decision making processes. This bias has been demonstrated 
consistently in multiple contexts and across a wide variety of disciplines and continues 
to influence decision making today. · Decisions made in a three-person group format 
were just as likely to be biased in hindsight as individual decisions. Differential 
results for the two case vignettes, however, do not provide support for Fischhoff s 
(1975) "immediate assimilation hypothesis ." The bias was present for the neutrally 
valenced case but not for the positively valenced case. If outcome information were 
immediately assimilated into what was already known, effectively replacing prior 
considerations, a bias would have been demonstrated for the positive case as well. 
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Results indicated, in fact, that outcome probabilities did not significantly shift toward 
the known outcome in hindsight for participants responding to the positively valenced 
.case. Results do, in contrast, provide support for the social psychological theory of the 
hindsight bias, namely that of the availability heuristic. Such a theory does not 
eliminate the possibility of differential case effects and provides an explanation for the 
. lack of significance with regard to the counterfactual reasoning task. As stated above, 
participants tended to provide more than one piece of evidence for the known . 
outcome, especially with regard to the positively valenced case, and tended to provide . 
academic evidence in support of the known outcome. If more heavily weighted 
evidence was provided for the known outcome, it can be concluded that the kn.own 
outcome remained salient in the decision makers minds, thus rendering the . · 
counterfactual reasoning task ineffective in increasing the salience of the .alternative 
outcome. 
With the rising use of decision "teams" across multiple medical, educational, 
and legal settings, further consideration is warranted with regard to the assumption that · 
two or more "heads" are better than one. The burden of proofremainswith the 
. proponents of group decision formats to demonstrate improvements in decision · 
accuracy and/or resilience to the negative effects of known decision errors on 
judgment. The hindsight bias was also not successfully eliminated in the current 
investigation through use of a previously documented counterfactual reasoning 
procedure. The nature of the beneficial effects of such a procedure remains to be 
determined before its widespread utility in eliminating the hindsight bias can be 
assumed. 
Table 1 
Pilot Study Results 
Correlated Groups T-Test 
N = 15 
•. Mean probability of 
positive outcome 
S.D. 
Positive Vignette 
(Jamie) 
66.67 
20.50 
Neutral Vignette 
(Kelli) 
54.33 
24.85 
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p < .05 
Table 2 
Mean Probability Assigned to Outcome: Positive Case/Positive Outcome (Jamie) 
Condition 
Individual 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
Group 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
N 
30 
30 
30 
10 
lO 
10 
Admit 
72 
67 (15) 
73 
69 
78 (7) 
69 
Decision 
Reject 
28 
33 
27 (8) 
31 
22 
31 (7) 
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Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants whose 
probability estimate for that particular outcome exceeds the corresponding foresight 
estimate (for hindsight participants) or .the corresponding hindsight estimate (for 
hindsight participants with an extra task). 
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Table 3 
Mean Probability Assigned to Outcome: Neutral Case/Negative Outcome (Kelli) 
Condition 
Individual 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
Group 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
N 
30 
30 
30 
10 
10 
10 
Admit 
47 
31 
34 (13) 
45 
37 
37 (5) 
Decision 
Reject 
53 
69 (24) 
66 
55 
63 (8) 
63 
Note . . The numbers in parentheses indicate thenumber of participants whose 
probability estimate for that particular outcome exceeds the corresponding foresight 
. estimate (for hindsight participants) or the corresponding hindsight estimate (for 
hindsight participants with an extra task). 
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Table 4 
Mean Confidence Rating Assigned to Prediction: Positive Case/Positive Outcome 
(Jamie) 
Condition 
Individual 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
Group 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
N 
30 
30 
30 
10 
10 
10 
Confident 
73 
79.(20) 
71 
73 
80 (7) 
65 
Rating 
Not Confident 
27 
21 
29 (18) · 
27 
20 
35 (6) 
Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants whose 
confidence rating of their prediction exceeds the corresponding foresight rating (for 
hindsight participants) or the corresponding hindsight rating (for hindsight participants 
with an extra task. 
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Table 5 
Mean Confidence Rating Assigned to Prediction: Neutral Case/Negative Outcome 
(Kelli) 
Condition 
Individual 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
Group 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
N 
30 
30 
30 
Confident 
73 
79 (22) 
73 
72 
84 (8) 
78 
Rating 
Not Confident 
27 
21 
27 (14) 
28 
16 
22 (7) 
Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants whose 
confidence rating of their prediction exceeds the corresponding foresight rating (for 
hindsight participants) or the corresponding hindsight rating (for hindsight participants 
with an extra task. 
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Table 6 
Mean Adequacy Rating Assigned to Information: Positive Case/Positive Outcome 
(Jamie) 
Condition 
Individual 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
Group 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
N 
30 
30 
30 
Adequate 
78 
80 (19) 
79 
74 
78 (7) 
71 
Rating 
Not Adequate 
22 
20 
21 (10) 
26 
22 
29 (4) 
Note . The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants whose 
adequacy rating of the information provided exceeds the corresponding foresight 
rating (for hindsight participants) or the corresponding hindsight rating (for hindsight 
participants with an extra task. 
Table 7 
Mean Adequacy Rating Assigned to Information: Neutral Case/Negative Outcome 
(Kelli) 
Rating 
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Condition N Adequate Not Adequate 
Individual 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
Group 
Foresight 
Hindsight 
Hindsight with Task 
30 
30 
30 
73 
80 (21) 
78 
77 
82 (8) 
80 
27 
20 
22 (8) 
23 
28 
20 (6) 
Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants whose 
adequacy rating of the information provided exceeds the corresponding foresight 
rating (for hindsight participants) or the corresponding hindsight rating (for hindsight 
participants with an ext~a task. 
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Table 8 
Pooled Multivariate Analysis of Covariance 
Source E 
Completion Time (covariate) 1.12 .344 
Outcome 1.80 .100 
Case 42.36 .000 
Process .62 .603 
Outcome x Case 1.06 .390 
Outcome x Process .51 .797 
Case x Process .78 .509 
Outcome x Case x Process .32 .928 
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Table 9 
Unpooled Multivariate Analvsis of Covariance 
Source F 
Completion Time (covariate) 1.74 .164 
Outcome .1.54 .168 
Case 25.34 .000 
Process 1.08 .360 
Outcome x Case 2.20 .045 
Outcome x Process .52 .790 
Case x Process .55 .648 
Outcome x Case x Process .62 .711 
Table 10 
Analysis of Variance Assessing Differences in Completion Time 
Source 
Process 
Outcome . 
Process x Outcome 
.E 
8.33 
9.60 
.80 
.005 
.000 
.450 
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Table 11 
Pairwise Comparisons of Completion Time by Outcome Condition 
Comparisons 
Foresight vs. Hindsight 
Hindsight vs. Hindsight+ Task 
. Foresight vs. Hindsight+ Task 
.201 
.000 
.026 
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Table 12 
Intercorrelations Between Time and Dependen t Variables for Group Responses by 
Case 
Variable 1 
1. Time 
2. Probability 
3. Adequacy 
4. Confidence 
l. Time 
2. Probability 
3. Adequacy 
4. Confidence 
2 
Positive Case (g = 90) 
-.338* 
3 
-.420** 
.428** 
Neutral Case (n = 90) 
-.067 .135 
-.196 
4 
-.460** 
.442** 
.663** 
-.020 
-.059 · 
.757** 
57 
Note. Values in bold type indicate intercorrelations between dependent variables and 
the covariate. 
*P. < .01 
**p_ < .001 
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Table 13 
Summary of Evidence Provided by Hindsight Participants Completing Counterfactual 
Reasoning Task 
Evidence for Evidence for 
Admission Frequency . % Rejection Frequency % 
Positively Valenced Case (Jamie) 
GPA 38 34 No Academic Clubs · 36 57 
SATs 31 28 GPA 16 25 
Sports 18 16 SATs 9 14 
Class Rank 13 12 Class Rank l 2 
Work Experience 8 7 Parents Didn't Attend 1 .2 
Ranked in Who's Who 3 3 
Neutrally Valenced Case (Kelli) 
GPA 29 39 SATs 50 70 
Academic Clubs 17 23 GPA 20 28 
Volunteer Work 15 20 Class Rank l l 
Class Rank 8 11 
Violin 5 7 
Current Time: 
Appendix A 
Case A 
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Jamie is a senior in high school. He lives with his parents who never attended 
coilege but strongly encourage him to apply. Jamie's older sister is currentlY: a 
sophomore in college. Jamie's goal is to attend an ivy league college in another state. 
The public high school he attends is in a large, urban school district, and he is 
currently ranked in the top 20% of his class. His cumulative grade point average 
(GPA) after his junior year in high school is a 3.7, or 90%. He is taking college 
preparatory classes and is currently earning a "B" average in those courses. Jamie has 
taken the_ Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) twice. His highest combined score is a 
1050, with a score of 500 in the Verbal section c:Uld a score of550 in the Math section. 
Jamie plays varsity football and is in the Letterman's Club at his high school, but he is 
not being considered for any college football scholarships. He is not in any academic 
clubs or organizations, although he is listed in the publication, !'Who's Who Among 
American High School Students." He has had a summer.job for two years working for 
a landscaping business. 
Hindsight condit ion: Jamie was recently accepted for admission by the ivy league 
college that he was most interested in, and he will be enrolling as an incoming first-
year student there in August , 1999. 
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Case B 
Current Time: 
Kelli is a senior in high school. She lives with her parents and has two younger 
brothers. Her father is a college graduate and manages a retail store, and her mother is 
a full-time homemaker. Kelli's goal is to attend an ivy league college in her home . 
state. The public high school she attends is in a relatively small, suburban school 
district, and Kelli is currently ranked in the top 30% of her class. · Her cumulative 
grade point average (GPA) after her junior year was a 3.5 or 88%. She is taking 
college preparatory classes and is currently earning a "B" average in those courses. 
Kelli has taken the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) three times. Her-highest combined 
score is a 900, with a score of 500 in the Verbal section and a score of400 in the Math· 
section. Kelli has volunteered for one year in the local city hospital as a "candy 
striper." She hopes to major in PreMed in college and eventually apply to medical 
school. Kelli is in the Math and Science Club at her high school, and she plays the 
violin in the school orchestra. 
Hindsight bias: Kelli recently found out that she was not accepted by the ivy league 
college that she hoped to attend. 
Appendix B 
Demographic Sheet 
Please complete the following questions anonymously: 
Age 
Number of semesters of college completed (for example, a current second-semester 
freshman will have completed · l semester of college): 
61 
Name of the course that you are receiving credit for by participating in this experiment 
(for example, PSY 113 --Introduction to Psychology): 
Current Time: 
Appendix C 
Participant Response Sheet 
-------
[Instructions adapted from Arkes et al., 19.88] 
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Based on your consideration of the information provided, what is the probability you 
would assign to each of the outcomes as the most likely one? 
Hindsight condition: Please respond as you would have before knowing the actual 
· outcome.
[Counter/actual Reasoning task instructions: After each of the following outcomes, 
please jot down one piece of evidence from the case description that would support 
that particular outcome as the piimary one.] 
· Assign a probability to .both outcomes, making sure that the probabilities add to 100% ..
Jamie will be accepted to the college of his choice. 
[Evidence] 
Jamie.will not be accepted to the college of his choice. 
[Evidence] 
% -------
% -------
TOTAL= 100% 
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[Adapted from Bukszar & Connolly, 1988 and Aspel, 1994] 
On a scale from O to 100, how adequate was the information you were given for 
making the above predictions (0 = completely inadequate/information not at all 
helpful; 100 = completely adequate/needed no more information than was provided)? 
On a scale from O to 100, how confident do you feel making these predictions based 
on the information provided to you (0 = not at all confident; 100 = completely 
confident)? 
Please indicate the time that you completed the above information: 
Current Time: 
--------
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Appendix D 
Procedural Guidelines and Instructions 
Prior to the participants' arrival~ the administration set is randomly assigned a 
decision process order (i.e., individual -- group or group _.;. individual) and to one of 
. three possible outcome/intervention groups (i.e. , foresight outcome, hindsight 
outcome , or hindsight outcome with a Cou."lterfactual Reasoning task); Thus , the 
entire administration set will receive the same instructions and will complete the same 
task in the same order. For example , administration set 1 may be assigned to the · · 
foresight outcome condition, where all participants make decisions first as individuals 
and then as members of three-person decision groups , Upon arrival, participants . 
randomly are to be assigned to read either Case A first or to read Case B first. 
Foresight Outcome Condition 
1. Upon an·ival, participants are to be given an individual packet containing: (a} 
two copies of the consent form, (b) a demographic sheet , ( c) smaller envelope 1, 
containing written instructions, either Case A or Case B, and a response sheet, and ( d) 
· smaller envelope 2, containing written instructions, the other case, and a second · 
response sheet. 
2. When all participants are seated, they are to be instructed to remove the 
contents of their envelopes and to read and sign .one copy of the consent forrri, which 
should then be collected by the examiner. 
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3. Participants are then to complete the demographic sheet included in their 
packets. 
4. Participants will next be asked to open smaller envelope 1 and read only the 
case description. 
The following instructions are to be read to the participants in addition to the written 
instructions already provided. Instructions will vary depending on whether the 
decisions are made as individuals or in groups: 
Individual Administration 
5. Now I will give you the instructions for filling out the response sheet. · You will 
have 20 minutes to complete this task. Based on your consideration of the information 
provided, what is the probability you would assign to each of the outcomes as the most 
likely one? By probability, I mean: what are the "odds" that this person will or will 
not get into college. For example, if you thought it was very likely (or that the odds 
were good) that President Clinton would be impeached, you might say that it is 80% 
likely that he will be impeached and 20% likely that he won't be. If you thought, 
instead, that he wouldn't be impeached, you might say that it is 20% likely that he will 
be impeached and 80% likely that he won't be. Keep in mind that your two 
probabilities MUST add up tq 100%. 
[Hindsight condition: Please respond as you would have before knowing the actual 
outcome.] 
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[Counter/actual Reasoning task instructions: After each of the following outcomes, 
please write down one piece of evidence from the case description to support why that 
particular outcome could be the real one. For example, under your probability rating 
· for why President Clinton will be impeached, you could state, "Counsel Kenneth 
Starr's report states that the president lied under oath." · And, under your probability 
rating for why President Clinton will not be impeached, you could state, "There will 
n~t be enough of a majority vote in the Senate to impeach the president."] 
6. Then, rate on a scale from O to 100, how adequate the information was that you 
were given for making these predictions? 
7. And finally, rate on a scale from O to l 00, how confident you feel making these 
predictions based on the information provided to you. 
8. Also, please write down the time that you start filling out the form at the top of 
the page and the time you finish filling out the form at the bottom of the page. 
· Group Administration 
5. . Now I will give you the instructions for filling out the response sheet. You will 
have 20 minutes to complete this task. You will be filling out the response sheet as .a 
three-person group. Starting with the first item, you must each use the scrap paper to 
write down your individual responses. Then each person is to read their responses and 
the group must come to a consensus and respond to each question with one group 
answer. Each group member must participate in this way. 
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Based on your consideration of the information provided, what is the probability you 
would assign to each of the outcomes as the most likely one? By probability, I mean: 
what are the "odds" that this person will or will not get into college. For example, if 
you thought it was very likely ( or that the odds were good) that President Clinton 
would be impeached, you might say that it is 80% likely that he will be impeached and 
20% likely that he won't be . If you thought, instead, that he wouldn't be impeached, 
you might say that it is 20% likely .that he will be impeached . and 80% likely that he 
won't be. Keep in mind that your· two probabilities MUST add up to 100%. 
[Hindsight condition: Please respond as you would have before knowing the actual 
outcome.] 
[Counter/actual Reasoning task instructions: After each of the following outcomes, 
please write down one piece of evidence from the case description to support why that 
particular outcome could be the real one. For example, under your probability rating 
for why President Clinton will be impeached, you could state, "Counsel Kenneth 
Starr's report states that the president lied under oath." And, under your probability 
rating for why President Clinton will not be impeached, you could state, "There will 
not be enough of a majority vote in the Senate to impeach the president." Again, each 
person is to write down a reason and then the group is to come to a consensus and 
respond with one group answer.] 
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6. Then, rate on a scale from 0 to 100, how adequate the information was that you 
were given for making these predictions? Again, each group member writes down 
. . their individual response and the group then must come to a consensus and respond 
with one group answer. 
7. And finally, rate on a scale from 0 to 100, how confident you feel making these 
predictions based on the information provided to you. Again; each group member 
writes down their individual responses and the group then must come to a consensus 
and respond with one group answer. 
8. Also, please write down the time that you start filling out the form at the top of · 
the page and the time you finish filling out the form at the bottom of the page. 
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